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COMMENTS
Prosecutors' Deterrence Appeals in State
Criminal Trials
The varieties of rhetorical excess employed by state prosecu-
tors in closing argument to juries are legion.1 In a few instances
through constitutional strictures, and more frequently through an
evolved consensus of state case law, certain forms of prosecutorial
rhetoric are condemned in criminal trials. Prosecutors may not, for
example, comment on the failure of the defendant to testify,2 make
overt appeals to racial prejudice,3 express their personal belief in a
defendant's guilt,4 engage in personalized arguments to individual
jurors,5 or assert the truth of facts that have not been presented in
evidence.6 This comment explores another classic technique of jury
persuasion, the use of deterrence rhetoric by prosecutors in closing
summation, and concludes that it, too, should be prohibited. In us-
ing deterrence rhetoric, the prosecutor argues that a defendant
should be convicted in order to deter him and others of like mind
from committing crimes in the future. Such rhetoric may be spe-
cific, focusing on the future conduct of the individual on trial, or
I Prosecutors' rhetoric has been discussed a number of times. See Alschuler, Courtroom
Misconduct by Prosecutors and Trial Judges, 50 TEx. L. REv. 629 (1972); Crump, The
Function and Limits of Prosecution Jury Argument, 28 Sw. L. REv. 505 (1974); Singer,
Forensic Misconduct by Federal Posecutors-and How It Grew, 20 ALA. L. Rav. 227
(1968); Vess, Walking a Tightrope: A Survey of Limitations on the Prosecutor's Closing
Argument, 64 J. CRni. L. & CRnINOLOGY 22 (1973); Note, The Nature and Consequences of
Forensic Misconduct in the Prosecution of a Criminal Case, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 946 (1954).
2 Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). See generally J. STEN, CLOSING ARGU-
mENT-THm ART AND THE LAW § 44 (1978).
See text and notes at notes 100-101 infra.
'See J. STEIN, supra note 2, § 70; Annot., 41 A.L.R. Fed. 10 (1979); Annot., 88 A.L.R.
3d 449 (1978). See also ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILTry DR 7-106(c) (4) (counsel
are not to assert personal opinions about the guilt of an accused).
5 See J. STEIN, supra note 2, § 80.
4 See Vess, supra note 1, at 27-31. There is also consensus among the states that prose-
cutors may not suggest that additional incriminating evidence has been suppressed, discuss
the possibility of pardon or parole, or argue that jurors' mistakes can be corrected on ap-
peal. See generally J. STasN, supra note 2, §§ 76, 78; Alschuler, supra note 1, at 634.
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general, pointing to the asserted causal relationship between the
jury's verdict and the behavior of the criminal element at large. It
appeals to jurors by "making predictions of the consequences of
. ..[their] verdict,"7 suggesting "that the people look to them for
protection against crime, and . . . illustrat[ing] the effect of their
verdict on the community or society generally with respect to obe-
dience to, and enforcement of, the law."8
This comment focuses exclusively on the use of deterrence ap-
peals in the evaluation of an individual's guilt or innocence in
state criminal trials.10 Because of the current strict barriers to fed-
eral habeas corpus review of prosecutorial excesses in state
7 ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE
PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION § 5.8(d), at 126 (Approved Draft 1971)
[hereinafter cited as ABA STANDARDS].
8 23A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1107 (1961) (footnotes omitted).
' Although one could perhaps make a case for the propriety of deterrence appeals in
the sentencing context, this comment discusses the use of such rhetoric only in the determi-
nation of an individual's guilt or innocence.
In jurisdictions with a bifurcated system of criminal procedure, the permissible limits of
prosecutors' deterrence appeals at the sentencing stage are the subject of increasing debate.
Compare Starvaggi v. State, 593 S.W.2d 323, 328 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (proper for prose-
cutor in arguing for imposition of the death sentence to warn jurors that "I hope he doesn't
come knocking on one of your doors at eight o'clock in the evening"), cert. denied, 100 S.
Ct. 3050 (1980) and Stone v. State, 574 S.W.2d 85, 90 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (proper to
urge jurors to "think about the other children that live in this community that are subjected
to this kind of conduct [rape]") with Brown v. Estelle, 468 F. Supp. 42 (N.D. Tex. 1978),
aff'd per curiam, 591 F.2d 1207 (5th Cir. 1979), a habeas corpus proceeding in which the
prosecutor at the sentencing stage of the trial engaged in "persistent and pronounced" mis-
conduct in his argument, id. at 49. According to the District Court, appeals such as "What
side are you on? Are you going to coddle them or going to punish them?" "urged the jury to
impose a sentence on petitioner not only for what he had done but for what other thieves
and criminals were doing," id. at 48, and in combination with other violations required a
new trial. See also Vaughn v. State, 126 Ga. App. 252, 190 S.E.2d 609 (1972); Sier v. State,
517 P.2d 803, 805 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973).
10 Standards of argument traditionally have been stricter in the federal courts; the fear-
less administration doctrine, on which this comment focuses, is a creature unique to state
case law. There is as yet no uniform federal standard to govern prosecutorial deterrence
rhetoric, however. Although some opinions have condemned deterrence appeals in the
strongest terms, see, e.g., United States v. Barker, 553 F.2d 1013, 1025 (6th Cir. 1977) (con-
viction reversed because of prosecutor's argument that "if you can't take this evidence and
find these defendants guilty on this evidence then we might as well open all the banks and
say, 'Come on and get the money, boys, because we'll never be able to convict them' "),
federal courts occasionally hold that specific appeals are within the bounds of permissible
advocacy, see, e.g., United States v. Stead, 422 F.2d 183, 184 (8th Cir.) (permissible to ask
jury "for the good of the community that you represent, rid ourselves of these burglars,
sneak thieves in the night ... and find him guilty as charged"), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1080,
398 U.S. 966 (1970). The usual practice, though, has been to condemn such appeals while
employing the harmless error doctrine to avoid reversal and retrial. See note 166 infra.
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courts," the states have been free to develop their own jurispru-
dence with regard to deterrence rhetoric. As a result, one en-
counters a broad spectrum of responses. At one end of this spec-
trum, many states use the "fearless administration of the law" and
analogous doctrines as a basis for permitting nearly all forms of
deterrence rhetoric.' 2 At the other end, a few states explicitly for-
bid deterrence appeals, however mildly worded, as inherently prej-
udicial.' 3 The large number of states between these positions are
more difficult to classify. Some accept the fearless administration
doctrine but employ categorical distinctions to discourage certain
forms of deterrence appeals; 4 others attempt to prevent "highly
prejudicial" deterrence appeals;' 5 and many use the harmless error
doctrine to avoid deciding the propriety of this rhetoric. 6
This comment first examines this spectrum of state responses.
It next considers the historical, evidentiary, and functional justifi-
cations for permitting deterrence rhetoric at the conviction stage of
trial, and finds them all wanting. Finally, the comment discusses
1 The structure for federal review of state prosecutorial argument is governed by Don-
nelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637 (1974). In that case Justice Rehnquist elaborated a
formidable array of requirements that have effectively precluded federal control over most
forms of rhetoric. First, the remarks must violate a specific right granted by a specific provi-
sion of the Bill of Rights. Second, appellants must demonstrate that the remarks had an
actual prejudicial impact; federal courts cannot engage in "hypothetical analysis" of the ef-
fect of the remarks on the jury. Third, the comments must not be "isolated passages" and
"but one moment" in an extended proceeding. Finally, the comments must meet a standard
of "egregious misconduct" necessary to amount to a denial of constitutional due process. Id.
at 642-46.
For the effect of Donnelly on federal control of deterrence rhetoric in state trials, see
Houston v. Estelle, 569 F.2d 372, 384 (5th Cir. 1978) ("The constitutional frontier stands
very far indeed from the core of good prosecutorial practice. . . ."); Perry v. Mulligan, 399
F. Supp. 1285 (D.N.J. 1975), revd sub. nom. United States ex rel. Perry v. Mulligan, 544
F.2d 674 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 972 (1977). One district court, applying Don-
nelly, has explicitly held that "there is no constitutional prohibition against reference dur-
ing argument to the deterrence function of the criminal law." Heffelfinger v. Thompson, 444
F. Supp. 309, 310 (E.D. Tenn. 1977) (permitting, although not "vouch[ing] for the propri-
ety" of, the argument that "I want to protect your daughter, your granddaughter, and the
daughters and granddaughters all over this United States .... How much of an example do
you want to set to other people who might be tempted to do this. .. ").
12 Most notable are Alabama, Georgia, Illinois, Missouri, Oklahoma, and Texas. See
text and notes at notes 17-46 infra.
"3 Most notable are Michigan, Pennsylvania and Virginia. See text and notes at notes
58-65 infra.
14 See text and notes at notes 49-51 infra.
15 See text and notes at notes 52-57 infra.
19 For a discussion of the impact of harmless error on this definitional process, see text
and note at note 167 infra.
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the procedural considerations involved in ensuring the effective
prohibition of deterrence rhetoric.
I. THE SPECTRUM OF DETERRENCE RHETORIC IN STATE COURTS
A. The Fearless Administration Doctrine in Practice
Many courts sanction deterrence rhetoric under the theory
that prosecutors should be allowed to exhort jurors to a fearless
administration of the law.17 This doctrine enables prosecutors to
employ several effective psychological stratagems in closing argu-
ment. One of the most common deterrence appeals stresses the
positive results of conviction, focusing on the ever-escalating crime
wave and the resultant deterioration of life in the jurors' commu-
nity."' The prosecutor seeks to transform the trial process into
something like a plebiscite on criminals in the community, de-
manding to know "what are we gonna do about them"1 " and in-
forming the jury that "it's your turn to stand up and be
counted."20 Because of their "unique position,"21 the prosecutor
17 E.g., People v. Hairston, 46 IlM. 2d 348, 375, 263 N.E.2d 840, 856 (1970) ("it is entirely
proper for the prosecutor to dwell upon the evils of crime and to urge the fearless adminis-
tration of the law"), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 972 (1971). The phraseology employed varies
from state to state. See, e.g., State v. Jaramillo, 110 Ariz. 481, 483-84, 520 P.2d 1105, 1107-
08 (1974) (prosecutor may "urge the jury to do its duty and uphold the law, and ... draw
inferences from conditions resulting from the failure to uphold the law"); State v. Gordon,
499 S.W.2d 512, 515 (Mo. 1973) ("prosecution has a right to call attention to the prevalence
of crime in a community and to argue that a defendant on trial should be convicted in order
that others of like mind might be deterred from criminal activity"); State v. Crawford, 478
S.W.2d 314, 320 (Mo. 1972) ("permissible call[s] for law enforcement and discouragement of
this type of crime"); Holloway v. State, 525 S.W.2d 165, 170 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975) (prose-
cutors may make "a proper plea for law enforcement").
18 See Embrey v. State, 283 Ala. 110, 118, 214 So. 2d 567, 575 (1968) ("We all know the
crime rate is rising and rising and rising .... You have got to determine whether or not
these juries are going to stop these robberies from going on."); State v. Moore, 112 Ariz. 272,
274, 540 P.2d 1252, 1255 (1975) ("We have all heard about the rising crime rate throughout
the country. We have heard about the rise in violence. We have read about it. We are sick of
it."); People v. Ivery, 72 MI1. App. 3d 158, 161, 390 N.E.2d 608, 611 (1979) ("Good God,
people are getting killed. People are being robbed .... And we have had it [crime] here in
this jury .. ").
19 Jones v. State, 555 P.2d 1061, 1066 (Okla. Crim. App. 1976) ("[W]hat are we gonna
do about these senseless killings, these robberies-execution-type killings .... And you have
got a chance to do something about it.").
20 Smith v. State, 258 Ind. 594, 601, 283 N.E.2d 365, 369 (1972) ("probably now, more
than ever more, you are going to have to come to the spot where it's your turn to stand up
and be counted").
21 People v. Griggs, 51 Ill. App. 3d 224, 227, 366 N.E.2d 581, 583 (1977) (jury was in a
"unique position to be able to do something" about increasing robberies).
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tells jurors that "you alone control this problem,"'2 and "you'll
never have a better opportunity to speak out on this matter.' 3
They are urged to let "the word go out through this jury"' to the
accused "and everybody like him out there' 5 that citizens will "do
something about it"'" and "teach them a lesson.' 7
Another strain of deterrence rhetoric stresses the conse-
quences that will ensue if the jurors do not convict the defendant.
Jurors are warned that by acquitting a defendant they will be con-
senting to his criminality, and accordingly will be responsible for
future lawlessness.'8 Criminals "are out there and they are consid-
ering the odds,"'29 prosecutors argue, and acquittals "will justify"3 0
criminal activity, grant a "license to kill,"31 "open up the flood-
gates for [criminal] activity,"' 2 "open . . .the door to rape"33 and
"tell [robbers] to come on in boy." 3'
2 Fausett v. State, 468 S.W.2d 92, 94 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971) ("You, and you alone
control this [drug] problem.... [Ilt is up to you to decide whether you want it in your
community.").
23 State v. Swenson, 551 S.W.2d 917, 920 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977) ("I want the word to go
out through this jury, and you'll never have a better opportunity to speak out on this mat-
ter, that if any one ever does this in this community they can know what to expect .... ).
1, Id. See also Hamilton v. State, 43 Ala. App. 192, 197, 186 So. 2d 108, 113 (1965)
("[s]end word out to everyone").
15 People v. Jackson, 19 IMI. App. 3d 689, 695, 312 N.E.2d 405, 409 (1974).
1 Richardson v. State, 354 So. 2d 1193, 1199 (Ala. Crim. App. 1978) ("If you want the
streets of the State of Alabama to be safe, now is the time for you to do something about
it."). See also State v. Whitlock, 598 S.W.2d 521, 522 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (violence in the
schools, and jurors' "opportunity to do something about it"); State v. Woodward, 587
S.W.2d 287, 291 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979) (jury has to "do something" about drug sales); Aracha
v. State, 495 S.W.2d 957, 959 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) ("do something" about "dope
pushers").
17 Dabbs v. State, 507 S.W.2d 567, 570 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974) (possession of
marijuana).
's Fletcher v. State, 52 Ala. App. 303, 307, 291 So. 2d 757, 760 (1973) (acquittal consti-
tutes consent to criminal behavior); People v. Benedik, 56 I. 2d 306, 310-11, 307 N.E.2d
382, 385 (1974).
" Cook v. State, 369 So. 2d 1251, 1254 (Ala. 1979).
30 State v. Rodriguez, 484 S.W.2d 203, 207 (Mo. 1972) (proper for prosecutor to con-
clude: "So an acquittal today will justify resisting arrest for any charge, allow striking of an
officer, and may set a course of conduct that might open up the floodgates for an activ-
ity-for a summer of activity along this line, or any time along this line.").
31 Cook v. State, 369 So. 2d 1251, 1254 (Ala. 1979).
:1 State v. Rodriguez, 484 S.W.2d 203, 207 (Mo. 1972).
Bowman v. State, 446 S.W.2d 320, 320 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969).
, Hamilton v. Commonwealth, 401 S.W.2d 80, 87 (Ky. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
1014 (1967); accord, Hill v. State, 253 Ark. 512, 530-31, 487 S.W.2d 624, 635-36 (1972) (if
defendant is acquitted, "you can bet your bottom dollar that every loaning institution and
every store in Howard County, Arkansas, is in trouble from now on"). See also State v. Cole,
588 S.W.2d 94, 100 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979) ("Think for a minute what a verdict of Manslaugh-
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One particularly inflammatory variant of this deterrence tech-
nique seeks to implant in jurors' minds the fear that acquittal of
the defendant and the resultant license granted to others will en-
danger their own safety or that of their families. Most jurisdictions
recognize that such appeals destroy the impartiality of the trial
and invite verdicts based on "visceral and unreasoned responses."3 5
Several states that follow the fearless administration doctrine,
however, sanction demagogic appeals, such as that acquittals of
rape defendants will constitute "an invitation. . . that they should
come to your neighborhood when your daughter goes out on a date
and your wife has to go to the store."3" Prosecutors may argue that
unless the jury convicts, "the next time you or your loved ones is
[sic] held up, kidnapped, robbed, beaten, there'll be no conviction
of the assailant.' 37 In considering the defendant's guilt, the prose-
cutor suggests, jurors should "picture [themselves] witnessing the
rape of one of [their] loved ones.''ss
Still another stratagem is to warn jurors of future criminal be-
havior by the defendant himself. Assertions that the defendant will
leave the courtroom with a "free license"3 9 to "go loose on the
streets"40 and resume his lawlessness 1 are permitted through cur-
sory citation to the fearless administration doctrine.
ter would mean in a case like that to people. They would say, 'Look at this. There isn't
anything worse than that. This man is getting off with Manslaughter.' It isn't easy to deter
that kind of crime."); Basalda v. State, 481 S.W.2d 851, 854 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
35 Commonwealth v. Harvell, 458 Pa. 406, 411, 327 A.2d 27, 30 (1974); see notes 50, 53
infra.
36 People v. Madden, 57 IlM. App. 3d 107, 114, 372 N.E.2d 851, 856 (1978). Although the
court focused upon the failure of defendant's counsel to object to the statement as waiver of
any error, it went on to defend the remarks as proper commentary on the evils of crime.
37 People v. Van Zile, 48 Ill. App. 3d 972, 984, 363 N.E.2d 429, 438 (1977).
"Parks v. State, 400 S.W.2d 769, 771 (Tex. Crim. App. 1966). See also People v. Ted-
der, 83 Ill. App. 3d 874, 404 N.E.2d 437, 445 (1980) (jurors should reflect upon "what's going
on in your home now ... and the people that you've left alone"); State v. Gray, 351 So. 2d
448, 460 (La. 1977) ("It's your decision to make as to whether or not we are going to put the
animals in the cages to keep them away from doing harm to us and our families or are we
going to have to put cages around our houses to keep the animals from coming in.").
39 People v. Galloway, 74 Ill. App. 3d 624, 628-29, 393 N.E.2d 608, 611 (1979) (prosecu-
tor also stated that Chicago is the way it is because of people like the defendant).
40 People v. Bost, 80 Ill. App. 3d 933, 956, 400 N.E.2d 734, 751 (1980).
41 See also Cronnon v. Alabama, 587 F.2d 246, 251 (5th Cir. 1979) (habeas corpus ap-
peal from Alabama murder trial: "Well, you turn him loose and whose little girl will be
next? Who will be next?"), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 974 (1980); Brand v. Wofford, 230 Ga. 750,
754, 199 S.E.2d 231, 234 (1973) ("This boy is going to take these nembutals and sell to yours
and my kids for a dollar apiece. If you want to turn him loose to do this, let him do it.");
People v. Johnson, 73 Ill. App. 3d 431, 435-46, 392 N.E.2d 587, 591 (1979) (acquittal will
give defendant "a license to go out there and stop kids on their way to school .... [M]aybe
[48:681
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A final appeal sanctioned by the fearless administration doc-
trine focuses the jurors' attention on their role in the law enforce-
ment process and on their "duty" to convict. Prosecutors argue
that jurors will not be doing their duty "if they turn every man
loose simply because you are afraid of convicting an innocent
man."4 2 Jurors are told that they "must support"'3 the efforts of
law enforcement officials and that because they are the crucial
"last link,"' 44 failure to convict will undermine the police and the
judicial system.45 To avoid this chaos, jurors are implored to return
a guilty verdict "that your friends and neighbors can be proud
of."
4 6
one day you may read in the paper ... someone was shot on the street and a gun was
used"; remarks held "within the realm of fair comment"); People v. Taylor, 18 Ill. App. 3d
367, 373, 309 N.E.2d 642, 647 (1974); State v. Ray, 600 S.W.2d 70, 73 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980)
("If you want this type of man crossing the bridge and coming into our county and raping
women in St. Charles County and [sic] let him go free."); State v. Reynolds, 603 P.2d 1223,
1228 (Or. Ct. App. 1979) (prosecutor urged jury not to acquit defendant "[b]ecause the next
time it might be one of you at the end of his barrel"); Debolt v. State, 604 S.W.2d 164, 169
(Tex. Crim. App. 1980) ("What I'm mainly concerned with is he is not among the public,
living next door to me or you or to anybody else .. ").
Unchecked rhetoric focusing on the future criminal actions of the defendant himself
would appear to fall within the Donnelly "egregious misconduct" standard, see note 11
supra. There is no valid state interest justifying this demagoguery. Empirical studies repeat-
edly have demonstrated our "critical incapacity" to predict future criminal behavior by the
defendant. N. MoRRus, Tim FuTuRu OF IMPIUSONmNT 62-73 (1974). The concept of danger-
ousness as used in sentencing (let alone conviction) has led to "gross injustice" in the appli-
cation of laws concerning homicide and sexual psychopathy. Id. at 63.
'2 State v. Durden, 264 S.C. 86, 91, 212 S.E.2d 587, 590 (1975).
43 Terhune v. State, 117 Ga. App. 59, 60, 159 S.E.2d 291, 293 (1967) ("we were proud of
our Atlanta police and must support them"). For an extreme example of this type of deter-
rence appeal, see Miller v. North Carolina, 583 F.2d 701, 708 (4th Cir. 1978) (district attor-
ney informed the jury that his law enforcement powers came from God and that to resist
those powers was to resist God; conviction reversed because of additional argument inciting
race prejudice).
" Chatman v. State, 509 S.W.2d 868, 869 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974) (jury "is the last link
in law enforcement and if it is not carried through, then [we] may as well just forget it. [We]
may as well say to heck with trying to get them to trial while they are still fresh. The Police
Department might as well say, 'Well, why try to risk my life. .. .' "). The "last link" genre
of deterrence rhetoric has had a long and colorful history in Texas. See, e.g., Pemberton v.
State, 55 Tex. Crim. 464, 468, 117 S.W. 837, 839 (1909) (proper to argue that "[i]f you do
not convict the defendant in this case, than [sic] you had as well close the doors of justice,
burn up the law books, tear down the courthouse, and let anarchy reign in this country").
"5 See, e.g., Amerson v. State, 43 Ala. App. 148, 151, 182 So. 2d 901, 904 (1965) ("Think
about how hard it is for the law enforcement officers to get out and work and all you hear is,
'Ah, they are shooting folks up in Covington County. They don't do nothing about it up
there in court.' "); People v. Agosto, 70 Ill. App. 3d 851, 857, 388 N.E.2d 1018, 1023 (1979).
46 Whittington v. State, 580 S.W.2d 845, 847 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
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B. The Limits of Deterrence Rhetoric
Although most states recognize some limits on the use of de-
terrence rhetoric, they disagree on where to set those limits. Courts
in some states permit the virtually unlimited employment of deter-
rence rhetoric under the fearless administration doctrine.47 Only
on rare occasions is oratory by prosecutors condemned; 4 deter-
rence rhetoric of the variety outlined above is permitted as a mat-
ter of routine.
Some states, although they explicitly accept the fearless ad-
ministration doctrine, seek to set prophylactic limits on certain
forms of deterrence appeals such as predictions of defendants' fu-
ture criminal acts49 and inflammatory evocations of jurors' per-
sonal fears.50 Case law in these states is rather inconsistent because
of an essentially ad hoc approach; tricks of the prosecutorial trade
enable prosecutors to couch these appeals in acceptable language,
thus rendering the states' formal distinctions meaningless in
practice. 51
47 Illinois and Texas are leading examples. See Illinois and Texas cases cited notes 17-
46 supra.
" E.g., People v. Payton, 72 Ill. App. 2d 240, 249, 218 N.E.2d 518, 522 (1966); Joyner v.
State, 436 S.W.2d 141, 144 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969).
4' See, e.g., State v. Heinrich, 492 S.W.2d 109, 115 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973) (if defendant is
not convicted, "he's going to hurt somebody"); Lime v. State, 479 P.2d 608, 609 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1979) (if defendants not convicted, "there will be somebody else's relative that will be
killed by these two men within I will say, a year or two").
50 See, e.g., Adams v. State, 229 Ark. 777, 779, 318 S.W.2d 599, 600 (1958) ("Now, gen-
tlemen if you turn this man loose go home and tell your daughters that you made it really
hard for them today because you turned a man loose that can run over them and take
anything from them he wants to and then come up here and tell [a] cock and bull story and
get away with it"); State v. Groves, 295 S.W.2d 169, 173 (Mo. 1956) ("if this defendant ever
got the opportunity your daughter could be the next one, or your grandchild or something").
61 For instance, in Missouri, a prosecutor may not suggest that the defendant himself
will commit another crime if acquitted, State v. Heinrich, 492 S.W.2d 109, 115 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1973), but may argue that "this type of man" will, State v. Ray, 600 S.W.2d 70, 73
(Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
That the prosecutor cannot argue that the jury should convict because their community
wants or expects them to has always been a fundamental rule of closing argument. Jackson
v. Commonwealth, 301 Ky. 562, 566, 192 S.W.2d 480, 482 (1946) (prejudicial to argue that
county is watching jurors to see what kind of character they have); Pennington v. State, 171
Tex. Crim. 130, 131-32, 345 S.W.2d 527, 528 (1961) (forbidding argument that the people of
the county expect defendant to be put away). See generally Annot., 85 A.L.R.2d 1132
(1962). By avoiding the buzzword "expect," however, prosecutors may bring virtually identi-
cal rhetoric within the ambit of the fearless administration doctrine. E.g., Pennington v.
Commonwealth, 455 S.W.2d 530, 532-33 (Ky. 1970) (wondering how jurors will feel when
they come face-to-face with friends and neighbors); Whittington v. State, 580 S.W.2d 845,
847 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
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Appellate courts in other states have not announced an ex-
plicit rule about the propriety of deterrence oratory. They have,
however, condemned references to defendants' future criminality,52
family-safety speeches,'$ and predictions that unless a particular
defendant is convicted it will be impossible to maintain law and
order in the jurors' community.5 These courts frequently offer as
their only reasoning statements such as that the "interest of jus-
tice" 55g requires reversal because particular rhetoric "exceeded
proper limits"'56 or was "inflammatory" and "highly prejudicial. '57
These conclusory sentiments, with nothing more, fail to give trial
judges and prosecutors a sense of what renders an argument "prej-
udicial." It is impossible to determine from the few appellate opin-
ions in these states whether deterrence appeals are handled at the
trial stage on a sliding scale of inflammatory content or are cate-
gorically prohibited.
A few states, most notably Michigan,58 Pennsylvania,5  and
52 See, e.g., Williams v. State, 68 So. 2d 583, 583 (Fla. 1953) (defendant will kill again);
Sims v. State, 371 So. 2d 211, 212 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (if jury acquits they should
"shake Alex Sims' hand" and say " '[g]o get another one Alex' "); People v. Slaughter, 28
A.D.2d 1082, 1082, 285 N.Y.S.2d 146, 147 (1967) ("in this time of permission, what we can
call an age of license, are you going to extend to the Henry Slaughters of this world the
license to strike out and kill, to disrupt their families, to steal, to do any thing that they
please because the world is against them, or are you going to call them to task? Are you
going to protect, finally here, at this point of the lawsuit, the rights of the community in
which you live?").
" See, e.g., Adams v. State, 192 So. 2d 762, 763 (Fla. 1966) ("I ask you to just think if
your wife wasn't there because she had been murdered by a robber .... [O]r your daugh-
ter. . . ." (emphasis omitted)); Barnes v. State, 58 So. 2d 157, 158 (Fla. 1952) ("What if it
was your wife or your sister or your daughter that this beast was after.. . ."); State v.
Jones, 266 Minn. 523, 524, 124 N.W.2d 727, 727-28 (1963) ("It could be my daughter, it
could be your daughter .... [Ilt could be my wife, it could be somebody else's wife.").
"See, e.g., Russell v. State, 233 So. 2d 154, 155 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970) (if people
like defendant are not convicted, "we are going to have a breakdown in society and we
are going to have people getting stabbed all over Orange County"); People v. Wallason, 62
A.D.2d 1026, 1026, 404 N.Y.S.2d 23, 24 (1978); People v. Moore, 26 A.D.2d 902, 905, 274
N.Y.S.2d 518, 519 (1966) (if jury wants to live in community where crime runs rampant, it
should acquit defendant); People v. Gioia, 286 A.D.2d 528, 530, 145 N.Y.S.2d 495, 498 (1955)
(acquittal would be "an invitation to every hoodlum and every drug addict and every bum
in New York... to indulge in robberies").
" People v. Moore, 26 A.D.2d 902, 902, 274 N.Y.S.2d 518, 519 (1966).
" Id.
7 Russell v. State, 233 So. 2d 154, 155 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
" See, e.g., People v. Biondo, 76 Mich. App. 155, 157, 256 N.W.2d 60, 61-62 (1977)
(argument in larceny case that business was the "life blood" of Detroit, and "if these busi-
nesses, of course, are preyed upon, then they will leave the city, and the city will die" de-
prived defendant of fair trial); People v. Meir, 67 Mich. App. 534, 536-38, 41 N.W.2d 280,
281-82 (1976) (prosecutor's argument that defendant might sell heroin to jurors' children
and that acquittal would condone drug usage was forbidden, and, because judge only mildly
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Virginia, 0 have explicitly rejected the relevance of deterrence con-
siderations in determining a defendant's guilt or innocence. 1
These states have decided that deterrence rhetoric, however mildly
presented, is inherently inflammatory. Failure to make the "impor-
tant distinction" that "[clonviction for an offense must be based
solely upon evidence of guilt, and not upon considerations of deter-
rence," is likely to result in "substantial prejudice" to a defen-
dant.62 These courts find "no justification" ' for deterrence rheto-
ric, because it tends to invite jurors to make an example of the
defendant,4 whereas "[tihe issue is not whether the jury approves
of crime, but whether the evidence shows the accused is guilty of it
under the law."6 5
chastised prosecutor for these remarks, reversal was required); People v. Williams, 65 Mich.
App. 753, 755, 238 N.W.2d 186, 187 (1975) (argument that "you have an opportunity to
effect [sic] the drug traffic in this city" was "highly prejudicial"); People v. Farrar, 36 Mich.
App. 294, 298, 193 N.W.2d 363, 365 (1971) ("The prosecutor may not subtly convert the
presumption of innocence into a presumption of guilt by appealing to the jurors to perform
a civic duty to support the police.").
59 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Cherry, 474 Pa. 295, 305, 378 A.2d 800, 805 (1977) (pros-
ecutor's remarks to jury asking them to tell the people of Philadelphia that "shootings on
the street like the wild West" will not be tolerated was an invitation to make an example of
defendant and required reversal); Commonwealth v. Harvell, 458 Pa. 406, 411, 327 A.2d 27,
30 (1974) (statement that "[p]eople don't want to go out at night. . . it might be one of you
next time. It might be you" invited jury to give vent to "visceral and unreasoned re-
sponses"). See also Commonwealth v. Anderson, 490 Pa. 225, 415 A.2d 887 (1980).
Recent opinions at the Superior Court level, however, have said that although, "not
approved," deterrence rhetoric will not be condemned if the "cumulative effect" is mild, and
that prosecutors may, "within proper limits, argue for law and order." Commonwealth v.
Clark, 421 A.2d 374, 378-79 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980); Commonwealth v. Nesbitt, 419 A.2d 64,
70 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980) (if defendant acquitted, "[l]et's all go get armed .... Bring back
Dodge City."). It is not clear whether these cases, which on their face contradict the deci-
sions of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, are aberrations or initial indicators of a doctrinal
shift.
" See Hutchins v. Commonwealth, 255 S.E.2d 459, 460-61 (Va. 1979) (argument in bur-
glary trial asking "[wihat message are you going to send out to the people of Franklin
County?" was impermissible); Bolton v. Commonwealth, 200 Va. 5, 10, 104 S.E.2d 1, 5
(1958) (impermissible to argue that "[y]ou members of the jury know that at the time-at
this particular time-in this particular community, we have been having a tremendous
amount of killings; we have had an unusual number of shootings, It is up to you members of
the jury . . ").
1 In somewhat less categorical language, Ohio courts appear also to have stringent
rules against arguing deterrence. See, e.g., State v. Agner, 30 Ohio App. 2d 96, 104, 283
N.E.2d 443, 449 (1972) (arguments such as "we have to do something about it" and "we
have a responsibility to stamp out this [drug] traffic" call for conviction as a duty to society
and require reversal). See also State v. Davis, 60 Ohio App. 2d 355, 397 N.E.2d 1215 (1978).
8" Hutchins v. Commonwealth, 255 S.E.2d 459, 461 (Va. 1979).
63 Id.
11 Commonwealth v. Cherry, 474 Pa. 295, 305, 378 A.2d 800, 805 (1977).
8" State v. Davis, 60 Ohio App. 2d 355, 362, 397 N.E.2d 1215, 1220 (1978).
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II. THE FUNCTIONS AND EFFECTS OF DETERRENCE RHETORIC
States that continue to permit deterrence appeals rely on pre-
cedent developed generations ago. Although some judges in these
states have questioned the continued validity of this precedent in
light of modern views on criminal law,6 6 opinions sanctioning de-
terrence rhetoric generally refuse to articulate a rationale beyond
the bald statement that such appeals have always been accepted.67
This part considers the underlying justifications for deterrence
appeals in greater depth. It analyzes the functions and effects of
this oratorical form from four perspectives: the propriety of social
policy arguments in the courtroom; the types of defendants against
whom deterrence oratory has traditionally been invoked; the use of
evidentiary principles to sanction such appeals; and the effect of
courtroom argument on jurors' deliberations. In each case the jus-
tifications for deterrence appeals are tenuous at best, and the con-
clusion is that such rhetoric should be forbidden in criminal trials.
A. Social Policy at Trial
The fearless administration doctrine rests on the premise that
prosecutors must be free to combat jury nullification-the ten-
dency of jurors to acquit defendants contrary to the evidence and
the judge's instructions on the law, for reasons of social policy or
personal sympathy. Proponents of deterrence oratory argue that
the effect of such rhetoric is not to encourage jurors to resolve
doubts against defendants, but merely to discourage improper nul-
" See, e.g., Whittington v. State, 580 S.W.2d 845 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979), an opinion
sanctioning the appeal for a guilty verdict "that your friends and neighbors can be proud
of." In his candid concurrence Judge Clinton noted:
Were we hearing it for the first time, I would not hesitate to sound the critic's gong
to the lyrical call of the prosecutor for a prideful verdict. It is, however, but a variation
on a theme that has received generally favorable reviews ....
Though dissonant to my own musical sense, the refrain is such a classic it will
continue to receive critical acclaim until its hypocritical notes are more clearly heard.
Meanwhile, in tune with stare decisis I concur in affirming the judgment of conviction.
Id. at 847-48 (footnote omitted).
67 Although it is difficult to measure the influence of precedent empirically, it is "one of
the dominant facts in explaining why many local practices seem so ingrained." D. Mc-
INTYRE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 50 (rev. ed. 1974); cf. State v. Burns, 119
Iowa 663, 671, 94 N.W. 238, 241 (1903) (rhetorical embellishments "have adorned the climax
and peroration of legal oratory from a time 'whence the memory of man runneth not to the
contrary,' and for us at this late day to brand their use as misconduct would expose us to
great censure for interference with ancient landmarks").
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lification sentiments when jurors believe defendants to be guilty.6 8
Such rhetoric, it has been argued, enables prosecutors to articulate
a useful "touchstone of social conscience" to assist jurors in mea-
suring the "social policy" implications of their verdict. 9 This argu-
ment is flawed for several reasons. First, it ignores the evolution of
the jury's function since the nineteenth century, when deterrence
rhetoric first became an issue for judicial comment. Second, from
occasional instances of nullification it draws an unwarranted as-
sumption that juries generally ignore the social rules embodied in
the criminal law. Finally, it presupposes that social policy issues
are relevant to an evaluation of an individual's guilt or innocence.
Judges first advanced the fearless administration doctrine as a
means to counteract their inability to limit the power of juries to
the determination of facts. Well into the nineteenth century, juries
in many states still were permitted both to decide the facts of the
case and to adopt, modify, or reject the law itself at will. Judges'
instructions in these states were viewed as merely advisory.7° In
this unpredictable environment, judges recognized the "undoubted
right"71 of prosecutors to make "fearless administration" appeals,2
See generally Scheflin, Jury Nullification: The Right to Say No, 45 S. CAL. L. REv.
168 (1972). Jury analysts have suggested that the jury by its very nature acts like a legisla-
ture in giving content to "reasonableness" standards embodied in the criminal law. See P.
DEvLrN, TRIAL BY JURY 164 (3d ed. 1966); H. KALvEN & H. ZESEL, THE AMEmcRAN JURY 182-
90, 221-41 (1966).
In several states, the jury sits in a single proceeding to determine both the question of
defendants' guilt or innocence and, if the verdict is guilty, the sentence. In the states with
such "unitary" proceedings that also permit deterrence appeals, courts occasionally make a
corollary assertion that such rhetoric affects only the jurors' second function. E.g., Hamilton
v. Commonwealth, 401 S.W.2d 80, 87-88 (Ky. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1014 (1967);
State v. Blumer, 546 S.W.2d 790, 792 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977). As a matter of common sense, it
is difficult to believe that jurors will be affected by deterrence appeals only with regard to
the sentencing function, and ignore the same appeals when making the determination of
guilt or innocence.
49 Crump, supra note 1, at 527-28.
70 The question of the jury's duty to follow the judge's instructions of law engendered
fierce ideological debates. See R. ELLis, THE JEFFERSONiAN Cnisis: CoURTs AND PoLmcs IN
THE YOUNG REPUBLIC 190, 197-98, 201-03 (1971). For a history of jury nullification and the
evolving role of the jury in the nineteenth century, see Howe, Juries as Judges of Criminal
Law, 52 H Av. L. REv. 582 (1939); Note, The Changing Role of the Jury in the Nineteenth
Century, 74 YALE L.J. 170 (1964).
In Illinois, where the fearless administration doctrine is particularly deeply embedded,
the question of the jury's duty to follow the judge's instruction of law was not conclusively
resolved until 1931, People v. Bruner, 343 IlM. 146, 175 N.E. 400 (1931), possibly explaining
the state's traditionally stalwart defense of deterrence rhetoric.
71 Siebert v. People, 143 Il. 571, 590, 32 N.E. 431, 436 (1892).
72 The expression "fearless administration" was first used by the Illinois courts in
Sanders v. People, 124 IMI. 218, 225, 16 N.E. 81, 83 (1888).
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defining the term as a "call upon the jury to sustain the laws. 73
Deterrence appeals thus were originally sanctioned as a means to
achieve a uniform administration of the laws and to limit "jury
lawlessness."
Jury nullification has substantially eroded since judges' in-
structions of law were made binding in state and federal courts.74
Nullification in the face of binding instructions, however, has con-
tinued to play an infrequent but notable role in two contexts.
First, juries historically have used their prerogative of nullification
on rare occasions when asked to convict individuals for violating
unpopular laws. Such "lawlessness" occurred in prosecutions under
the fugitive slave laws and during Prohibition, for example; the
controversy arose again in the Vietnam war era. 5 Second, studies
of the jury suggest that on occasion jurors exercise leniency when
the case is one in which they can empathize with the defendant.7 6
Such cases include violations of gambling, game, and liquor laws;
apparently the belief is that toleration of violations of such laws is
widespread.7 7
Permitting admonitions for a fearless administration of such
sumptuary legislation could conceivably be defended by arguing
that jurors disinclined to enforce these laws should be reminded of
their purpose and importance. 8 Relying on these peripheral cases
7 Siebert v. People, 143 Ill. 571, 590, 32 N.E. 431, 436 (1892). See also People v. Wood,
318 I1. 388, 149 N.E. 273 (1925).
74 The distinction between jury lawlessness in the nineteenth century and its modern,
more restricted version is that traditionally the jurors were explicitly instructed to judge the
laws for themselves, whereas today jurors can ignore the law through their unreviewable
power to acquit the defendant despite conclusive evidence of guilt. The modern function is
said to be a prerogative in fact as opposed to one in law. On this question of the balance
between freedom and obligation of the criminal jury, see Kadish & Kadish, On Justified
Rule Departures by Officials, 59 CAIF. L. REv. 905 (1971); Scheflin, supra note 68.
75 See H. KALvEN & H. ZasEL, supra note 68, at 291 n.10; Scheflin, supra note 68, at
176-77.
74 H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 68, at 193-218, 301-38.
7 Id. at 286-97. See also W. CORNISH, THE JuRY 119-20 (1968); Andenaes, The General
Preventive Effects of Punishment, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 949, 961 (1966) (discussing "morally
neutral" fields of law, such as parking regulations, currency regulations, and price
regulations).
78 In addition, it might be argued that because jurors are demonstrably inclined to treat
drunk drivers sympathetically, see H. KALVmN & H. ZxisEL, supra note 68, at 293-96, a pros-
ecutor should be allowed to make an appeal for "fearless administration" because of the
detrimental consequences of leniency. Many states permit such rhetoric. E.g., State v.
Blumer, 546 S.W.2d 790, 792 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977) (jury asked to send a message advising the
public that "drunk drivers are punished in Boone County"); Payne v. State, 164 Tex. Crin.
306, 310, 298 S.W.2d 151, 155 (1957) (infliction of penalty would "go a long way" toward
stopping "this kind of a thing on the highway"). The appeal is condemned in many other
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for a broad rule allowing deterrence rhetoric is problematical for
two reasons, however. First, it suggests that some vague, undefined
category of defendants-those for whom juries are likely to feel
sympathy-should be subject to different standards of trial proce-
dure. Second, it ignores the context in which the rule operates in
the overwhelming majority of cases. The most frequent effect of
the fearless administration doctrine is to sanction inflammatory
and prejudicial deterrence appeals in cases in which jurors' sympa-
thies have been shown to rest with the prosecution-offenses
against property, narcotics sales, rape, and murder.79 Given the
current tenor of public fear and outrage over the prevalence of
crime in our society, 0 it is inaccurate to maintain that jurors need
to be incited into convicting for such offenses when they believe
defendants to be guilty.81 It is far more likely that deterrence rhet-
oric, by injecting visceral appeals for the solution of social
problems into emotion-laden trials, has the effect of undermining
the fair, deliberate evaluation of an individual's guilt or innocence.
Deterrence speeches become a means whereby the prosecutor, in-
voking threats to the safety of jurors' families and conjuring up the
spectre of other criminals "out there . . . considering the odds, 82
can undermine the presumption of innocence and implicitly ask ju-
rors to adjust their thresholds of reasonable doubt for conviction.83
states. E.g., People v. Lewis, 52 Cal. App. 2d 824, 313 P.2d 972 (1957) (rhetoric, however,
was harmless error).
Incredibly, at least two states-Georgia and Oklahoma-appear to condemn deterrence
appeals against drunken-driving defendants as prejudicial but sanction similar appeals
against felony defendants as proper appeals for fearless administration. Compare Collins v.
State, 86 Ga. App. 157, 159-60, 71 S.E.2d 99, 101 (1952) and Seely v. State, 471 P.2d 931,
933 (Okla. Crim. App. 1970) with Brand v. Wofford, 230 Ga. 750, 754, 199 S.E.2d 231, 234
(1973) (if acquitted, defendant will sell drugs to jurors' children) and Jones v. State, 555
P.2d 1061 (Okla. Crim. App. 1976) ("what are we gonna do about" murder).
71 H. KALVEN & H. ZmisEL, supra note 68, at 395-410.
60 One indication of the current mood is the simultaneous appearance this year of cover
stories devoted to crime in the two most widely read American news magazines. See The
Plague of Violent Crime, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 23, 1981, at 46; The Curse of Violent Crime,
T E, Mar. 23, 1981, at 16.
" Furthermore, a basically undemocratic notion seems to underlie any suggestion that
incitement is the proper means for ensuring that juries render verdicts that are desirable
from the standpoint of social policy.
82 Cook v. State, 369 So. 2d 1251, 1254 (Ala. 1979).
8 Many of the state courts that forbid deterrence appeals allude to the tendency of
such arguments to undermine the reasonable doubt standard. See text and notes at notes
58-65 supra. The use of deterrence appeals would appear to violate the function of "reason-
able doubt" as doubt "based on reason which arises from the evidence or lack of evidence,"
Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 360 (1972).
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Furthermore, those states that permit prosecutors to make so-
cial policy appeals condemn similar policy arguments by defen-
dants in arguing for acquittal. Recognizing the jurors' de facto
powers of leniency, courts do not allow nullification instructions; 4
they forbid defense counsel to argue social policy in their summa-
tions,1 and, when defense counsel do make policy-oriented re-
marks, they recognize prosecutors' right to rebuttal.s These pro-
phylactic restrictions are premised on the belief that policy appeals
by defendants, irrelevant to the question of guilt or innocence, in-
vite "the ultimate logic of anarchy. ' 87 In light of these restrictions
on the defensive use of policy arguments, one can just as easily
maintain that it is the unchecked use of deterrence rhetoric by the
prosecutor that threatens the "ultimate logic" of tyranny.
In contrast to the jurisdictions where deterrence appeals are
approved or at least tolerated, a small number of state courts have
recognized the inherently prejudicial effect of deterrence oratory
and explicitly rejected the logic of the fearless administration doc-
trine. 8  Moreover, the American Bar Association's Standards Re-
lating to the Prosecution Function and the Defense Function,8 9
the most ambitious attempt yet to define the proper scope of
courtroom argument, states unequivocally:
U E.g., United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1133 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (defendants on
trial for destruction of Dow Chemical property to protest manufacture of napalm were not
entitled to nullification instruction); United States v. Moylan, 417 F.2d 1002, 1009 (4th Cir.
1969) (same with regard to clergy members claiming moral justification for destruction of
draft files).
85 E.g., Scott v. State, 51 Ala. App. 192, 197, 283 So. 2d 642, 647 (1973) (defense argu-
ment that "root causes of crime" are in society was not permitted because irrelevant to the
question of guilt or innocence); State v. Reynolds, 41 N.J. 163, 195 A.2d 449 (1963); Rezeno
v. State, 484 S.W.2d 374 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972). See generally Martin, Closing Argument
to the Jury for the Defense in Criminal Cases, 58 J. CRIm. L.C. & P.S. 2 (1967).
$6 See text and notes at notes 184-187 infra.
* United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1133 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
See text and notes at notes 58-59 supra. Consider the reasoning of the Michigan
judiciary:
This Court is aware of the seriousness of the drug problem and realizes it touches the
lives of many average citizens, generating much fear and dismay. We recognize, too,
that jurors share the average citizen's desire to eliminate the narcotics traffic. In such
an emotion-laden situation, sensibilities are easily inflamed. Because emotional reac-
tion to social problems should play no role in the evaluation of an individual's guilt or
innocence, prosecutors must exercise special care to avoid arousing jurors' emotions
concerning such issues.
People v. Williams, 65 Mich. App. 753, 756, 238 N.W.2d 186, 187-88 (1975).
89 ABA STADARDS, supra note 7.
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(c) The prosecutor should not use arguments calculated
to influence the passions or prejudices of the jury.
(d) The prosecutor should refrain from argument which
would divert the jury from its duty to decide the case on the
evidence, by injecting issues broader than the guilt or inno-
cence of the accused under the controlling law, or by making
predictions of the consequences of the jury's verdict.90
The ABA Standards have experienced an odd reception, however.9 1
Academic commentary often has approved the Standards while
continuing to accept the fearless administration doctrine, 2 thus
failing to recognize or explore the mutually exclusive nature of
these disparate doctrines. Many courts go to remarkable lengths to
acknowledge the ABA Standards while utilizing traditional fearless
administration doctrines9e-an inconsistent reasoning process that
lets prosecutorial policy appeals in through the back door.
B. The Targets of Deterrence Rhetoric
The reverence for the fearless administration doctrine also is
misplaced because it ignores the types of defendants against whom
deterrence oratory historically has been invoked. Many states at
one time used the doctrine to sanction inflammatory, racially ori-
ented deterrence arguments before white juries. They character-
ized appeals to jurors for convictions that would "throw a chill
down the spine of every negro' '94 and protect white women from
the "brute lust"'95 of black men as "mere expression[s] of opinion
90 Id. § 5.8(c)-(d).
91 Only a few states have formally adopted the Standards. See, e.g., People v. Biondo,
76 Mich. App. 155, 256 N.W.2d 60 (1977); Commonwealth v. Cherry, 474 Pa. 295, 378 A.2d
800 (1977).
92 Compare J. STEIN, supra note 2, § 14 (responsibilities of prosecutors under ABA
STANDARDS, supra note 7) with id. § 79 (appeal to responsibility of jury proper); id. § 82
(reference to increase or prevalence of crime proper); and id. § 83 (appeal for fearless
administration of the law proper).
93 See, e.g., People v. Bost, 80 Ill. App. 3d 933, 956, 400 N.E.2d 734, 751 (1980), in
which the court held that the prosecutors' exhortation not to let the defendant "go loose on
the streets" was not addressed to "making predictions of the consequences of the jury's
verdict," but rather to "urging a fearless administration of the criminal law."
King v. State, 141 Tex. Crim. 257, 258-59, 148 S.W.2d 199, 200 (1941) (conviction will
"throw a chill down the spine of every negro in Gregg County and thereby stop some of
these negro killings"; held permissible as "mild effort at oratory").
95 Norman v. Commonwealth, 104 S.W. 1024, 1025 (Ky. Ct. App. 1907) (if black defen-
dant not convicted, then "every negro in this commonwealth can go out and load himself
with mean whiskey, and go subject any white woman, any white child, to the gratification of
his brutal passion and brute lust").
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as to the consequences of a failure to enforce the law"S---the iden-
tical language currently used to define the nature of deterrence ap-
peals and their effect on juries. 7 Similar styles of argument were
routinely permitted in many parts of the nation against other mi-
nority defendants.98 At first on the state level,99 and later as a mat-
ter of federal constitutional law applicable to the states under the
fourteenth amendment, this type of argument came to be con-
demned; deterrence appeals explicitly invoking a defendant's race,
creed, or ethnicity are now viewed as grounds for automatic rever-
sal as a denial of due process. 100
In light of this constitutional concern, it is inadequate to re-
quire prosecutors to avoid explicit expressions of prejudice against
minorities while permitting them to use such prejudice, when
cloaked in more subtle language, to the same inflammatory ends.101
" Cauley v. State, 156 Ark. 577, 579, 247 S.W. 772, 772 (1932) (argument that black
defendant must be convicted to protect white women). See also Davis v. State, 209 Ala. 409,
410, 96 So. 187, 188 (1923) (although remark that "savage" instincts in blacks come from
ancestral heritage in "the jungles of Africa" placed "too great stress" on defendant's ances-
try, remark excused for lack of exception and caution from the bench); Jackson v. State, 136
Ala. 22, 25, 30, 34 So. 188, 189, 191 (1903) (legitimate to argue that if black defendant
acquitted, "then, the first thing you know, [black mobs] will be taking a white man out and
hanging him").
*7E.g., Hill v. State, 253 Ark. 512, 530-31, 487 S.W.2d 624, 636 (1972).
08 E.g., Rosenthal v. United States, 45 F.2d 1000, 1003 (8th Cir. 1930) (because the
"business acumen of the Jewish race" was a recognized matter of common knowledge, state-
ment that "I never knew of a Jew before that would surrender a piece of warehouse. . for
nothing" was permissible); People v. Reyes, 133 Cal. App. 574, 577, 24 P.2d 531, 532 (1933)
(the "average Mexican" faces death "unflinchingly" and can take other lives calmly).
"Beginning early in this century, appellate courts in southern states began to exercise
increasingly strict supervision over racial oratory in courtrooms. See Annot., 45 A.L.R.2d
303 (1956).
'00 See Miller v. North Carolina, 583 F.2d 701, 708 (4th Cir. 1978) (conviction required
automatic reversal where prosecutor argued in rape case that there was no way a white
woman would ever consent to having sexual relations with a black man); Kelly v. Stone, 514
F.2d 18, 19 (9th Cir. 1975) ( reversal required in rape case for argument that "maybe the
next time it won't be a little black girl from the other side of the tracks; maybe it will be
somebody you know"); United States ex rel. Haynes v. McKendrick, 350 F. Supp. 990, 998-
1006 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (petitioner denied due process where prosecutor referred in closing
argument to mannerisms, appearance, weaknesses, early sexual maturity, verbal inarticu-
lateness, and hairstyles of blacks as a group), aff'd, 481 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1973).
101 Many courts will not condemn racially oriented deterrence appeals unless they ex-
plicitly discuss race. E.g., United States ex rel. Kirk v. Petrelli, 331 F. Supp. 792, 795 (N.D.
Ill.) (permissible to state that jurors should show people on "the south side of Chicago" that
crime not tolerated), af'd, 492 F.2d 1245 (7th Cir. 1971); State v. Rodriguez, 484 S.W.2d
203, 207 (Mo. 1972) (permissible to say that acquittal will "open up the floodgates" for a
"summer of activity" of street violence). But see United States v. Haynes, 466 F.2d 1260
(5th Cir. 1972) (use of phrase "Burn, baby, bum" in closing argument highly prejudicial);
Brown v. United States, 370 F.2d 242, 246 & n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (argument that if black
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No court has ever attempted to explain how minority defendants
are any less prejudiced by appeals to "put the animals in the
cages" 102 than they are by outright racial slurs; both arguments
have the same potential for undermining dispassionate analysis
and inviting prejudice as an element in the calculus for conviction.
Given the realities of the composition of the criminal docket and
the suspicions prevalent in American communities, urban and ru-
ral, against particular classes of individuals-distinguished by race,
lifestyle,10 3 or political belief'l-the use of deterrence rhetoric to
strike deep-seated and often unconscious chords of prejudice
against an accused "and everybody like him out there"'' 03 is incon-
sistent with recent efforts to eradicate prejudice in the courtroom.
The serious constitutional difficulties involved in such "us against
them"1106 oratory are not satisfactorily resolved by a mechanical ap-
plication of the fearless administration doctrine.
An additional problem with deterrence rhetoric stems from
the types of behavior against which it may be invoked. For in-
stance, deterrence appeals against defendants on trial for political
crimes-subversion, espionage, draft evasion-traditionally have
been condemned in the strongest terms. In Viereck v. United
States,107 which involved the conviction of a German agent during
World War II, the prosecutor in his summation had told jurors
that they "have a duty to perform here" 108 and that "[t]he Ameri-
can people are relying upon you ladies and gentlemen for their
protection against this sort of a crime, just as much as they are
relying upon the protection of the men who man the guns in Ba-
defendant not convicted, "you might as well have martial law. You make the choice. You
live with it," held, "in the context of current events," to be "an especially flagrant and
reprehensible appeal to passion and prejudice."); Joyner v. State, 436 S.W.2d 141, 144 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1969) (deterrence argument that the country was on the "verge of anarchy,"
made shortly after the 1967 Detroit race riots, was reversible error).
102 State v. Gray, 351 So. 2d 448, 460 (La. 1977). See also State v. Vernon, 251 La. 1099,
1114, 208 So. 2d 690, 695 (1968) (characterization of black defendant as an "animal" and
question, "Who's safe in this city with men like him on the street?" permissible because
evidence against defendant supported the invective).
103 E.g., Smith v. State, 258 Ind. 594, 601, 283 N.E.2d 365, 369 (1972) (denunciation of
"hippie[s] out of Chicago" before an Indiana jury); Greer v. Commonwealth, 455 S.W.2d
555, 557-58 (Ky. 1970).
104 See text and notes at notes 107-115 infra.
105 People v. Jackson, 19 Ill. App. 3d 689, 695, 312 N.E.2d 405, 409 (1974).
106 This is a pervasive theme of deterrence oratory. See, e.g., cases cited notes 19, 29,
34, 37, 44 supra. See also J. OSBORN, THE MIND OF THE JUROR 92 (1937) (prejudice is the
"thirteenth juror").
107 318 U.S. 236 (1943).
100 Id. at 247 n.3.
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taan Peninsula, and everywhere else." 109 In dictum,110 Chief Justice
Stone characterized this language as "offensive to the dignity and
good order with which all proceedings in court should be con-
ducted,"' as well as "highly prejudicial"11 because it was spoken
in a time of heightened emotions. Other courts have recognized
that "when patriotism is at a high pitch," ' jurors are likely to lose
their "mental poise,' 1 4 so that appeals to "return a verdict in
favor of America"'1 5 violate the constitutional guarantee of a fair
and impartial trial.
An arbitrary pattern of argument based on the type of alleged
criminal activity results."' No court has ever explained how ap-
109 Id.
10 The conviction was reversed because the trial judge's instructions on foreign agent
laws were too broad; the defendant's activities "on behalf of" the Nazis consisted primarily
of publishing and distributing fascist literature. Id. at 242-45.
" Id. at 248.
112 Id.
11 Hall v. United States, 256 F. 748, 752 (4th Cir. 1919) (violation of Espionage Act).
114 Id.
21 Bary v. United States, 248 F.2d 210, 213 (10th Cir. 1957) (in prosecution under the
Smith Act for conspiracy to organize Communist Party, prosecutor also dwelt upon the Cold
War and the possibility of actual war between the United States and Russia). For other
examples of inflammatory patriotic appeals, see Taglianetti v. United States, 398 F.2d 558
(1st Cir. 1968) (remarks in tax evasion case that defendant deprives the country of "the
dollars and cents we need in the till to fight Communism, to fight the war in Viet Nam"),
afl'd, 394 U.S. 316 (1969); Greenberg v. United States, 280 F.2d 474 (1st Cir. 1960); Elmer v.
United States, 260 F. 646 (8th Cir. 1919); August v. United States, 257 F. 388, 393 (8th Cir.
1918) (in prosecution for bribery to evade the draft, prosecutor told jury that its verdict
would "waft its way to the agents of hell opposed to us across the mighty waters, and there,
gentlemen, the verdict of this jury will be read and heard by the war lords of Germany as a
beat from the pulse of the American people").
I" Although case law is sketchy, it also appears to be the settled practice to condemn
deterrence oratory for white-collar offenses such as tax evasion and antitrust violations. See
United States v. Cotter, 425 F.2d 450 (1st Cir. 1970) (argument at time of first moon landing
in tax evasion case that if people do not pay their taxes there will be no more moon land-
ings); Taglianetti v. United States, 398 F.2d 558, 566 (1st Cir. 1968) (tax evasion harms
Vietnam war effort); United States v. Sprengel, 103 F.2d 876, 884 (3d Cir. 1939) (mail fraud:
"We have got to convict these people. They will go wild with this kind of thing. The only
way it can be done is by conviction."); J. STEIN, supra note 2, § 81. See also United States v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940), an antitrust case in which the prosecutor
urged jurors to control "malefactors of great wealth," these "eager, grasping men" who "take
the law into their own hands ... without any consideration for the underling or the poor
man .... We are going to stop it ... or we are going down into ruin as did the Roman
Empire." Writing for the Court, Justice Douglas characterized this language as a "highly
improper" appeal to class prejudice; the trial judge's curative instruction, however, was
deemed sufficient to cure the error. Id. at 238-43.
Some courts and commentators have offered disconcerting categorizations of different
types of criminal activity to justify disparate rhetorical standards based on the nature of the
offense. Compare J. STEiN, supra note 2, § 81 (appeals to jurors' interests as taxpayers ima-
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peals to stand by one's family and community are any different in
their potential for prejudicial impact from appeals to stand by
one's country. It is anomalous to suggest that jurors' emotions and
prejudices are impermissibly ignited by appeals to national secur-
ity interests, but that analogous appeals to civic and family secur-
ity against social violence are acceptable.
C. The Evidentiary Underpinnings of Deterrence Oratory
Judges historically have granted "wide latitude" to prosecu-
tors in arguing inferences, deductions, and analogies from evidence
introduced at trial.117 This presumption that each side must be
free to argue its theories of the case, however "forced, unnatural,
and untenable," is based on the premise that partisan advocacy
best promotes the objectives of the jury fact-finding process.""
State courts defending deterrence appeals under the "wide lat-
itude" theory frequently neglect to balance the need for vigorous
summation against the modern, limited functions of closing argu-
ment. Although unrestrained argument between the defendant and
counsel for the Crown was characteristic of English criminal trials
in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, procedural reforms
commencing early in the eighteenth century have shifted the func-
tion of argument to evidentiary summation at the close of trial.119
The purposes of closing argument are to provide the jury with
analysis of contested and uncontested evidence, "sharpen and clar-
ify issues for resolution," explain difficult concepts of law, and sug-
gest to the jury whether the burden of proof has been met. 20
Courts allowing deterrence appeals in the face of these narrow
functional purposes generally recognize that closing argument is
governed by the rules of evidence.121 Their categorization of deter-
proper) with § 83 (appeals for law enforcement proper); compare 75 Am. Ju. 2D Trial
§§ 287, 288 (1974) (appeals to prejudice against corporations and class prejudice improper)
with id. § 225 (remarks illustrating "evil consequences" of failure to perform jury duties
proper). See also Crump, supra note 1, at 526 (deterrence appeals focusing on conditions
within the jurors' community are proper, as opposed to those "relating to external criminal
acts or conditions in the country or in other communities").
11 J STIN, supra note 2, § 15. See generally 6 J. WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 1807(3) (3d ed.
1940).
128 6 J. WIGMORE, supra note 117, § 1807(3); see Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862
(1975) (extending through the fourteenth amendment the right to closing summation in all
state nonjury criminal trials).
119 Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 860-61 (1975).
120 Id.; J. STEIN, supra note 2, § 2; Crump, supra note 1, at 506.
2 See, e.g., People v. Durso, 40 Ill. 2d 242, 253, 239 N.E.2d 842, 848 (1968), cert. de-
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rence appeals as reasonable inferences from the evidence and as
matters of "common knowledge" subject to judicial notice is sub-
ject to attack, however. Jurors sit solely to adjudicate the issue of a
defendant's guilt or innocence based on what he did, when, where,
how, and with what motive or intent.122 By any accepted standard
of relevance,123 arguments that conviction of the defendant will de-
ter others from similar offenses1 24 are neither probative of a defen-
dant's guilt nor themselves matters properly provable in the case.
Even if such arguments were relevant, they would be impermissi-
bly prejudicial because their probative value is outweighed by the
emotional responses they invite.1 25
Wigmore defined the logical process of drawing inferences
from the evidence as a matter of persuading the trier of fact that
fact A follows from fact B.126 In this "domain of logic" 12 7 the prose-
cutor is free from restraint. The premise for permitting this wide
latitude is that all asserted inferences, however implausible, are by
definition relevant because the evidence supporting the logical as-
sertions would not have been admitted in the first place if it had
been devoid of probative value.1 28 Many state appellate courts mis-
construe this principle; it is difficult to perceive how appeals urging
jurors to "picture yourself witnessing the rape of one of your loved
ones,"1 29 or asserting that acquittal will "justify" criminal behav-
ior,130 that if "these animals on the street" are not "caged where
they belong," they will "dictate in our county," ' and that unless
convicted "these human vultures [will] crawl on the bellies of our
nied, 393 U.S. 1111 (1969); Jones v. State, 555 P.2d 1061, 1066 (Okla. Crim. App. 1976).
Texas, however, has explicitly exempted its "plea for law enforcement" doctrine from the
rules of evidence. E.g., Alejandro v. State, 493 S.W.2d 230, 231-32 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
22 See Davis, Judicial Notice, 55 COLUM. L. Rv. 945, 952 (1955).
113 See generally FED. R. Evm. 401-402 & Advisory Comm. Notes; 1 J. WGMORE, supra
note 117, §§ 27-29.
124 Examples of "deterrence evidence" would include FBI crime statistics for the jurors'
community, opinion polls demonstrating the degree of public concern for crime, expert testi-
mony on the sociologicial effects of law enforcement as a deterrent to would-be criminals,
and so forth.
'" See generally FED. R. Evm. 403 & Advisory Comm. Notes; 1 J. WIGMORE, supra note
117, § 29(a); Dolan, Rule 403: The Prejudice Rule in Evidence, 49 S. CAL. L. Rv. 220, 220-
44 (1976).
12 6 J. WIGMORE, supra note 117, § 1807(3); see id. § 1 (argument and evidence
distinguished).
127 Id. § 1807(3).
121 Id.; see 1 id. §§ 9, 28.
... Parks v. State, 400 S.W.2d 769, 771 (Tex. Crim. App. 1966).
1S0 state v. Rodriguez, 484 S.W.2d 203, 207 (Mo. 1972).
Costilla v. State, 609 P.2d 788, 790 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980).
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helpless and defenseless women" 13 2 are the product of logical rea-
soning from the evidence.
Deterrence arguments are defended by some courts as matters
that are "common knowledge" or subject to judicial notice.133
These doctrines can have no application to deterrence rhetoric.
First, the proposition that "conviction deters" is not within the
narrow realm of "elemental experience" encompassed by the doc-
trines."3 4 More fundamentally, even matters of common knowledge
and judicial notice cannot provide a basis for argument where they
are not admissible in the case."3 ' Argument may be based on infer-
ences from record evidence or on matters commonly known, but
such rhetoric must, like record evidence, be probative of the defen-
dant's guilt or innocence.3 6
Thus shorn of evidentiary underpinnings, deterrence appeals
would appear to violate the hearsay rule and the sixth amendment.
'1 Hill v. State, 144 Tex. Crim. App. 415, 423, 157 S.W.2d 369, 373 (1941), rev'd on
other grounds, 316 U.S. 400 (1942).
133 E.g., Embrey v. State, 283 Ala. 110, 214 So. 2d 567, 575-76 (1968) (argument that
"[w]e all know the crime rate is rising and rising and rising.... You have got to determine
whether or not these juries are going to stop these robberies from going on" proper because
prevalence of crime is "a matter of common knowledge in that it has been discussed in the
press, on radio and television for many, many months"); Robinson v. State, 47 Ala. App. 51,
54, 249 So. 2d 872, 875 (1971) (reference to recent fire bombings in Mobile in arson
prosecution).
134 The universe of facts embraced by the "common knowledge" doctrine has been de-
fined as those facts so universal, notorious, or unquestioned as to make it unprofitable to
require proof of their existence. Statements that fire burns, that the period for human gesta-
tion is normally nine months, or that a particular well-known street lies in the business
district of town are not objectionable because requiring formal proof of such facts would be
a waste of judicial resources. Historical and literary analogies also are admitted under the
..common knowledge" doctrine to illustrate difficult principles of law or processes of reason-
ing. See generally J. MCCORMICK, EvmENCE §§ 328-329 (2d ed. 1972); 6 J. WIGMORE, supra
note 117, § 1807; 9 id. § 2570 (counsel may "ask the jury to refer to their general
knowledge") (emphasis omitted)); Levin & Levy, Persuading the Jury with Facts Not in
Evidence: The Fiction-Science Spectrum, 105 U. PA. L. Rxv. 139 (1956); Morgan, Judicial
Notice, 57 HARv. L. REV. 269 (1944).
135 See 6 J. WioMoRE, supra note 117, § 1806 (courtroom argument "must be based
solely upon those matters of fact which evidence has already been introduced or of which no
evidence need ever by introduced because of their notoriety as judicially noticed facts").
136 The division of the fact-finding process into the search for legislative facts on the
one hand and adjudicative facts on the other also undermines the case for deterrence ora-
tory. Adjudicative facts, which relate to the particular event that gave rise to the litiga-
tion--questions of "who did what, when, where, how, and with what motive or intent"-are
within the jury's realm. J. McCoRMIcK, supra note 134, § 328. Legislative facts include so-
cial, economic, and political data used in "informing a court's legislative judgment on ques-
tions of law and policy." Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administra-




Arguments not properly based on record evidence, judicial notice,
or the common knowledge doctrine render the prosecutor himself
an unsworn witness not subject to cross-examination, thus violat-
ing the fundamental principle of the hearsay rule.' In addition,
permitting the prosecutor to go beyond the record in his closing
argument, with no right of reply, violates the defendant's sixth
amendment right to confront and interrogate adverse witnesses. 138
D. The Sporting Theory of Courtroom Argument
Although the fearless administration doctrine is subject to
criticism on functional, historical, and evidentiary grounds, state
courts occasionally offer an additional defense of deterrence ora-
tory: such rhetoric fully comports with the "sporting theory of jus-
tice,1139 the view that a criminal trial "'is a legal battle, a combat
in a sense, and not a parlor social affair.' ,,'4o The tradition of
"great advocates whose logic glowed and flowed with the heat of
forensics""141 is deeply embedded in our popular culture, and the
suggestion of rhetorical limitations strikes many as leading to "list-
less, vigorless summation of fact in Chesterfieldian politeness."" 2
137 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 7, commentary to § 5.8(a) (arguments not based on
record evidence are "assertions of fact not proved [and] amount to unswom testimony of
the advocate not subject to cross-examination"); 6 J. WiGMoRE, supra note 117, § 1806.
13 See generally Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363 (1966); 5 J. WIGmORE, supra note
117, § 1364 ("The right of confrontation is the right to the opportunity of cross-
examination").
Justice Douglas frequently advocated a more vigorous use of the confrontation clause to
control prosecutors' rhetorical excesses in state and federal proceedings, arguing that the
prosecutor's function "is not to tack as many skins of victims as possible to the wall," and
that "[t]he prosecutor is not a witness; and he should not be permitted to add to the record
either by subtle or gross improprieties." Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 650-51
(1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting). This approach is treated analytically in Carlson, Argument
to the Jury and the Constitutional Right of Confrontation, 9 Cnmn. L. BULL. 293 (1973).
13 The expression is from Roscoe Pound, who characterized this attitude as "only a
survival of the days when a lawsuit was a fight between two clans" in his seminal essay The
Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction With The Administration of Justice, 29 A.B.A. Rzp. 395,
404-06 (1906).
140 Price v. State, 388 So. 2d 517, 520 (Ala. Crim. App. 1977) (quoting Arant v. State,
232 Ala. 275, 280, 167 So. 540, 544 (1936)).
141 Ballard v. United States, 152 F.2d 941, 943 (9th Cir. 1945), rev'd on other grounds,
329 U.S. 187 (1946).
141 Id. See also United States v. Wexler, 79 F.2d 526, 530 (2d Cir. 1935) (L. Hand, J.)
("a jury inevitably catches this mood and... the truth is not likely to emerge, if the prose-
cution is confined to such detached exposition as would be appropriate in a lecture, while
the defense is allowed those appeals in misericordiam which long custom has come to sanc-
tion"), cert. denied, 297 U.S. 703 (1936); Nelms & Blum Co. v. Fink, 159 Miss. 372, 383, 131
So. 817, 820 (1930) (prosecutor "may explore all the shores of thought and experience; he
1981]
The University of Chicago Law Review
A corollary assertion-usually implicit, on occasion articu-
lated-is that jurors take these appeals at their "true worth":143 as
"mere argument" 144 and not as evidence to be weighed in reaching
their verdict. These courts assert that innocent defendants are not
convicted by deterrence rhetoric, on the grounds that such a notion
attributes to the jury a "stupidity and absence of common sense
which is incredible. ' 145 If the defendant is guilty, on the other
hand, then the deterrence considerations are viewed as fully
justified.141
Such defenses of deterrence rhetoric are questionable for sev-
eral reasons. First, ex post justifications advanced by prosecutors
and trial judges-that if a defendant is guilty, deterrence appeals
may be invoked to reinforce this determination by the jury, whose
fact-finding function is to determine guilt or innocence-run
counter to the principle of a presumption of innocence until con-
viction in a fair and impartial trial governed by uniform
procedure. 47
Furthermore, the "true worth" argument is empirically un-
founded. While the impact of oratory on individual jurors is an
inherently speculative matter,148 many jurists and commentators
have rejected the "true worth" rationale. The prosecutor occupies
a position of considerable prestige; 49 the Supreme Court recog-
may, if he will, take the wings of the morning and fly not only to the uttermost parts of the
sea but to the uttermost limits of space in search of illustrations, similes, and metaphors to
adorn his argument").
143 Price v. State, 348 So. 2d 517, 520 (Ala. Crim. App. 1977).
14 United States v. Kravitz, 281 F.2d 581, 586 (3d Cir. 1960).
145 Id. See also DiCarlo v. United States, 6 F.2d 364, 386 (2d Cir.) ("To sheer [the
prosecutor] of all oratorical emphasis ... is to deny what has always been an accepted
incident of jury trials, except in those jurisdictions where any serious execution of the crimi-
nal law has yielded to a ghostly phantom of the innocent man falsely convicted"), cert.
denied, 268 U.S. 706 (1925); State v. Burns, 119 Iowa 663, 671, 94 N.W. 238, 241 (1903)
("[Rhetorical excesses] give zest and point to the declamation, relieve the tediousness of the
juror's duties, and please the audience, but are not often effective in securing unjust
verdicts.").
148 See State v. Gray, 351 So. 2d 448, 460 (La. 1977), where in sanctioning an appeal to
"put the animals in the cages," the court asserted that "[c]ertain morally reprehensible con-
duct, such as that in issue in the present case, defies characterization as civilized behavior
and may more faithfully be described as that of an animal."
14 Cf. State v. Cyty, 50 Nev. 256, 256 P. 793, 794 (1927) ("if the state has a strong case,
it is not necessary, and if it has a close case, such misconduct is gross injustice to the
defendant").
14' See, e.g., Kalven, Advocacy and the Jury System: The Impact of the Trial Lawyer,
44 F.R.D. 169 (1968).
149 See generally ABA STANDARDS, supra note 7, at 18-21; THE PROSECUTOR IN AmERICA
(J. Douglas ed. 1977).
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nized long ago that because of this respect for the office, "improper
suggestions [and] insinuations . . . are apt to carry much weight
against the accused." 150 At the culmination of trial, closing argu-
ment carries a "significant persuasive force";151 it has been recog-
nized since antiquity15 2 that in cases "where the skill of counsel
can make the difference, it is the closing argument more than any
other single stage of the case that determines who wins or who
loses."1 53 Although deterrence appeals sometimes are employed in
situations where guilt cannot be doubted, they are often found in
cases turning on sharp factual disputes for resolution by the
jury-matters of conflicting evidence and witness credibility,1 "
provocation, 55 and the insanity defense. 58
The assertion that deterrence rhetoric does not affect jurors'
deliberations ignores an important premise of our criminal trial
procedure, namely, that jurors frequently do have biases and weak-
nesses. 157 Rules governing voir dire examination and pretrial pub-
licity s5 seek to minimize this potential for bias; rules of evidence
seek to ensure a carefully controlled presentation of relevant, pro-
bative formal evidence. 5 9 Other forms of rhetorical license have
'" Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
's' ABA STANDARDS, supra note 7, commentary to § 5.8.
"' See Aristotle's admonition to the prosecutor that "the accuser must create prejudice
in the epilogue, that his hearers may have a livelier recollection of it." ARmSTOTLE, RHETomc
3.14 (J. Freese trans. 1926).
155 J. KAPLAN & J. WALTZ, THE TRIAL OF JACK RuBy 310 (1965); accord, F. BAILEY & H.
'ROTHBLATr, FUNDA ENTALS OF CRiMINAL ADVOCACY § 444 (1974).
15 E.g., Perry v. Mulligan, 399 F. Supp. 1285 (D.N.J. 1975), rev'd sub nor. United
States ex rel. Perry v. Mulligan, 544 F.2d 674 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 972; Reid
v. State, 119 Ga. App. 368, 370, 166 S.E.2d 900, 902 (1969); People v. Van Zile, 48 I1. App.
3d 972, 984, 363 N.E.2d 429, 438 (1977); Clark v. State, 264 Ind. 524, 536-37, 348 N.E.2d 27,
35-36 (1976) (harmless error); Greer v. Commonwealth, 455 S.W.2d 555, 557-58 (Ky. 1970).
155 E.g., State v. Moore, 112 Ariz. 271, 274, 540 P.2d 1252, 1255 (1975); People v.
Benedik, 56 Ill. 2d 306, 310-11, 307 N.E.2d 382, 385 (1974); State v. Rodriguez, 484 S.W.2d
203, 207 (Mo. 1972).
I" E.g., State v. Karstetter, 110 Ariz. 539, 543-44, 521 P.2d 626, 630-31 (1974); Jacks v.
State, 394 N.E.2d 166, 176 (Ind. 1979).
157 The use by prosecutors of standard rules of thumb, computerized data, and psycho-
logical evaluations in choosing certain "types" of jurors based on sex, age, family back-
ground, and occupation in order to assemble a jury with "favorable attitudes" toward the
prosecution increases the probability that jurors will be swayed by rhetorical appeals. See R.
SIMON, THE JuRY: ITs ROLE IN AMECAN SocIETY 29-47 (1980); Note, The Constitutional
Need for Discovery of Pre-Voir Dire Juror Studies, 49 S. CAL. L. REv. 597 (1976); cf. F.
BAILEY & H. ROTHBLATT, supra note 153, §§ 318-342 (jury selection by defense counsel).
's See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976); Murphy v. Florida, 421
U.S. 794 (1975); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
151 See notes 123, 125 supra.
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been forbidden because their "true worth" is viewed as prejudi-
cial.160 The casual attitude toward deterrence rhetoric in many
state courts fails to appreciate the potential impact of such appeals
and ignores the inconsistency of the "sporting theory" with mod-
ern trial procedure.
III. THE ENFORCEMENT OF RHETORICAL STANDARDS
Clear rhetorical standards are the necessary first step in elimi-
nating deterrence appeals from the courtroom. The ABA Stan-
dards referred to earlier offer a useful model.161 It would be an
empty gesture, however, to adopt such standards without taking
stern measures to enforce them, for "[i]f we continue to do nothing
practical to prevent such [mis]conduct, we should cease to disap-
prove it.' 6 2 In addition to defining clear standards of acceptable
rhetoric, an effective procedural framework must encourage de-
fense counsel to object to appeals that violate the standards, place
the burden of eliminating such rhetoric on prosecutors and trial
judges, and preserve scarce appellate resources by controlling de-
terrence appeals at the trial level.
The procedures adopted in many states, however, foster ex-
actly the opposite results. Standards remain undefined; the burden
of eliminating this rhetoric is cast upon defense counsel; trial
judges are given virtually free license to set whatever rhetorical
standards they wish; and appellate courts are increasingly bur-
dened with reviewing prosecutorial misconduct. Deterrence appeals
receive implicit approval, thus perpetuating a confident cynicism
among prosecutors that the tolerable range of misconduct is broad.
Judge Frank, condemning this attitude of "helpless piety" toward
rhetorical abuses, noted the effective judicial message to
prosecutors:
160 See text and notes at notes 2-6, 100-101, 107-115 supra.
161 See text and note at note 90 supra. Michigan and Pennsylvania have adopted the
Standards as a model for courtroom argument. See notes 58-59, 91 supra.
Because it is impossible to anticipate and define all varieties of deterrence appeals in
advance, one might argue that any effort to eradicate such rhetoric by means of a clear rule
would be quixotic. This argument is unpersuasive. Problems of line drawing are encountered
in all rules governing rhetoric. Determining when an argument violates the Griffin stricture,
asserts personal knowledge of defendant's guilt, or appeals to prejudice, frequently is diffi-
cult, but difficulties in fixing the exact scope of these rules should not call the legitimacy of
the rules themselves into question.
"' United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 155 F.2d 631, 661 (2d Cir.) (Frank, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 742 (1946).
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"Government attorneys, without fear of reversal, may say just
about what they please in addressing juries, for our rules on
the subject are pretend-rules. . . . The deprecatory words we
use in our opinions are purely ceremonial." Government coun-
sel, employing such tactics, are the kind who, eager to win vic-
tories, will gladly pay the small price of a ritualistic verbal
spanking. The practice of this court-recalling the bitter tear
shed by the Walrus as he ate the oysters-breeds a deplorably
cynical attitude towards the judiciary.163
Procedural responses vary significantly between the states
manifesting a determination to discourage deterrence rhetoric and
those employing an essentially laissez-faire approach. This part ex-
amines these contrasting frameworks to identify the procedural ap-
proaches that serve the needs of prudent judicial administration
while preserving the rights of defendants.
A. The Harmful Effects of Harmless Error
The harmless error doctrine is premised on the belief that in-
tolerable social costs would result if every trial error required re-
versal and retrial.164 This doctrine is used extensively in reviewing
rhetorical excesses by prosecutors.165 Many jurisdictions refuse to
reverse convictions even where the trial judge overrules defense ob-
jections to inflammatory deterrence appeals, reasoning that such
rhetoric could not possibly have operated to convict an innocent
defendant.' In the context of rhetorical misconduct, the harmless
error doctrine is abused in several respects.
163 Id.
"" The adverse effects of the harmless error doctrine are by no means unique to rhetor-
ical standards. The doctrine is used to review a broad range of trial errors, and has been the
subject of significant judicial and academic criticism. See R. TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF
HARMLESS ERROR (1970); Field, Asssessing the Harmlessness of Federal Constitutional Er-
ror-A Process in Need of a Rationale, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 15 (1976); Note, Harmful Use of
Harmless Error in Criminal Cases, 64 CORNELL L. REv. 538 (1979); Comment, Principles for
Application of the Harmless Error Standard, 41 U. Cm. L. REv. 616 (1974).
165 See, e.g., Dunlop v. United States, 165 U.S. 486, 498 (1897):
There is no doubt that, in the heat of argument counsel do occasionally make remarks
that are not justified by the testimony, and which are, or may be, prejudicial to the
accused.... If every remark made by counsel outside of the testimony were ground
for a reversal, comparatively few verdicts would stand, since in the ardor of advocacy,
and in the excitement of trial, even the most experienced counsel are occasionally car-
ried away by this temptation.
166 Jacks v. State, 394 N.E.2d 166, 176 (Ind. 1979) (harmless, thought not "commend-
able," to argue that if defendant acquitted by reason of insanity he would go free and walk
"the same streets" as jurors); Clark v. State, 264 Ind. 524, 536-37, 348 N.E.2d 27, 35-36
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Harmless error is used in many states to avoid any attempt to
enunciate standards for closing argument in the first place. Many
state courts decline to rule on the propriety of deterrence appeals
because the error, "if any," is viewed as harmless.1 7 This recurrent
refusal to elaborate the permissible bounds of prosecutorial rheto-
ric leaves trial judges and counsel without any sense of the stan-
dards that should be followed.
A second misuse of harmless error occurs in setting the thresh-
old for probable prejudice of rhetorical abuses. In many states the
defendant must prove not only the existence of rhetorical error,
but also that the error resulted in "sufficiently grave"168 juror hos-
tility as to place him in "grave peril"''  of improper conviction.
Because the effect of prosecutorial argument in a given case is an
inherently speculative consideration, not subject to easy identifica-
tion or quantification, 17 0 it is virtually impossible to meet this
burden of demonstrating prejudicial impact.
(1976) (harmless error for prosecutor to urge jurors to disregard testimony of two witnesses
as a matter of civic duty); Hatcher v. State, 230 Miss. 257, 261-67, 92 So. 2d 552, 555-57
(1957) (harmless error to argue that "these good Lauderdale County people sitting out in
this audience .... are wondering whether this sort of thing is going to be licensed"); Jones
v. State, 610 P.2d 818, 820 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980) (questioning whether jurors had the
"intestinal fortitude" to stop crime held to be harmless error).
It is also the usual practice of federal appellate courts to criticize deterrence rhetoric
while using harmless error analysis to uphold convictions in federal jury trials. See, e.g.,
United States v. Hawkins, 595 F.2d 751, 754-55 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (prosecutor may not substi-
tute emotion for evidence by equating, directly or by innuendo, a verdict of guilty with a
blow against the drug problem; error, however, was harmless), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 910
(1979); United States ex rel. Clark v. Fike, 538 F.2d 750, 759-60 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1064 (1977).
167 People v. Simbolo, 188 Colo. 49, 53, 532 P.2d 962, 964 (1975) (district attorney "may
have gone too far" in arguing that community must be protected from rapists like the
defendant); Maldonado v. State, 265 Ind. 492, 501, 355 N.E.2d 843, 849 (1976) (recognizing
without resolving ambiguous lines of precedent); Warner v. State, 265 Ind. 262, 265-66, 354
N.E.2d 178, 181 (1976); Greer v. Commonwealth, 455 S.W.2d 555, 557-58 (Ky. 1970) (dia-
tribe against "hippie[s]" was a reasonable presentation of case; if it was not, it was harmless
error); Terrell v. State, 262 So. 2d 179 (Miss. 1972) (district attorney "probably should not
have made" statement that outsiders will "get [the] message" that juries are not "tough" if
defendant acquitted); Overstreet v. State, 470 S.W.2d 653, 654 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971).
1" This is the test in North Carolina. State v. Hunter, 28 N.C. App. 465, 467-68, 221
S.E.2d 837 (1976) (if defendant acquitted, "then law and order in this country might as well
go, too").
189 This is the test required by Indiana. Maldonado v. State, 265 Ind. 492, 501, 355
N.E.2d 843 (1976) ("This may be the most important thing you'll ever do for your commu-
nity. A chance to serve and do your duty .... .
17' See, e.g., Kalven, supra note 148, at 170. Professors Kalven and Zeisel noted that
their empirical study of jury behavior "has ... joined that distinctive group of books that
can be quoted on both sides of the issue" of the prejudicial impact of prosecutors' disclosure
to the jury of defendants' prior criminal records. H. KALvsN & H. ZmssL, supra note 68, at
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Harmless error analysis also invites judges to review the trial
record to ascertain whether, absent the error, there was enough ev-
idence to support the conviction; this amounts to a usurpation of
the jury's traditional role as sole finder of fact, and can provide few
principled guidelines for lower courts.1 7 1 Finally, abusive use of
harmless error undercuts the supervisory responsibilities of state
appellate courts to define and enforce proper courtroom proce-
dures, thus removing incentives for trial judges and prosecutors to
abide by the rules. The doctrine operates effectively to curtail a
defendant's right to be judged solely on the basis of guilt or
innocence.
By contrast, a number of state courts employ harmless error
with scrupulous care to avoid these consequences. Rather than us-
ing the doctrine to avoid defining rhetorical limits, these states at-
tempt to articulate "clearly defined" rules of argument for prose-
cutors to observe and trial judges to enforce. 7 2 These guidelines
are reinforced by strict standards for review. Rather than placing
the burden on the defendant to prove that deterrence appeals
placed him in "grave peril," some states, upon determining that
the prosecutor has engaged in forbidden argument, require the
state to prove no "reasonable possibility" for prejudicial impact.17 3
In other states, courts refuse to engage in harmless error analysis
at all when the trial judge permits violations to go unchecked; they
vi (Phoenix ed. 1971).
171 Judge Joe R. Greenhill of the Texas Supreme Court has suggested that the harmless
error doctrine should be translated to read, "The judge sure goofed up the trial, but we
think the defendant is guilty anyway, so what the hell." Quoted in Alschuler, supra note 1,
at 658-59. See also Field, supra note 164, at 35 ("Such a practice is difficult to reconcile
with the accepted rule that a trial judge may not direct a verdict against a defendant in a
criminal case, regardless of the strength of the evidence against him."); Note, supra note
164, at 543.
Apart from problems of usurping jury functions, the harmless error doctrine, though
asserted to be a mechanism for the conservation of scarce judicial resources, has increased
appellate workloads significantly. See id. at 544. See also United States v. Freeman, 514
F.2d 1314, 1321 (D.C. Cir. 1975) ("Despite ... verbal slaps-on-the-wrist, prosecutorial mis-
conduct continues to provide 'one of the most frequent contentions of defendants on ap-
peal.' Our experience thus suggests that courts must begin to take prophylactic considera-
tions together with probable prejudice to defendant in deciding whether to reverse."
(footnote omitted) (quoting Alschuler, supra note 1, at 631)).
172 People v. Farrar, 36 Mich. App. 294, 299, 193 N.W.2d 363, 366 (1971); see cases cited
notes 60-62 supra.
173 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 254 Pa. Super. 454, 460, 386 A.2d 37, 41
(1978). This standard would still permit the state to avoid retrial if the effect of the error
was demonstrably minimal; evidence might include the ambiguity of the appeal, failure to
object, curative measures taken at trial, and provocation by defense counsel.
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argue that "[u]nless we enforce the rules we encourage their viola-
tion and add to the burden of appellate courts .... [Prosecutors
and trial judges] have only themselves, not the appellate courts, to
blame if a judgment of conviction is reversed and must be retried
because of improper argument. '" 17 4
B. Courtroom Procedures
The role of the trial judge should be of central concern in pro-
cedural reform. Where rhetorical abuse occurs, the trial judge can
take appropriate curative action to guard defendants' rights and
make appellate review unnecessary. Moreover, strong prophylactic
rules focused on defining standards for judicial response to rhetori-
cal excess can exert a great deterrent effect on courtroom misbe-
havior. State appellate courts, however, generally grant a wide
range of discretion to the trial judge in setting courtroom stan-
dards, based on the finding that only trial judges are in the posi-
tion to "evaluate the impact of argument complained of."'17 5 With-
out clearly defined rules of argument, unsympathetic judges permit
cruder rhetorical standards, and conscientious judges are con-
fronted with confused precedent generally deferential to
prosecutorial bombast.
In the absence of a clear showing to the contrary, there is a
strong appellate presumption that judicial actions at the trial
stage-sustaining defense counsel's objections, instructing the jury
to disregard a prosecutor's rhetoric-are sufficient to cure any pos-
sibility of prejudicial error.178 But notions of the required measure
of judicial cure vary widely. In many states, essentially unhelpful
responses by the judge-"Let's move along," "This is just argu-
ment," "Stay within the record, counsel"-frequently are held suf-
ficiently curative.17 7 Similarly, merely sustaining objections to
174 People v. Farrar, 36 Mich. App. 294, 299, 193 N.W.2d 363, 366 (1971). Many juris-
dictions combine a virtually irrebuttable presumption of prejudice with supervisory consid-
erations to require reversal where prosecutors make racially inflammatory appeals or predic-
tions about defendant's future conduct, the threat to jurors' families, or the breakdown in
society that would result from acquittal. See cases cited notes 49-50, 52-65, 100 supra.
176 State v. Durden, 264 S.C. 86, 91-92, 212 S.E.2d 587, 590 (1975); accord, State v. Ray,
600 S.W.2d 70, 73 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); State v. Reynolds, 603 P.2d 1223, 1228 (Or. Ct. App.
1979); State v. Walton, 5 Wash. App. 150, 152, 486 P.2d 1118, 1120 (1971).
176 See State v. Gonzales, 105 Ariz. 434, 437, 466 P.2d 388, 391 (1970); Commonwealth
v. MacDonald, 368 Mass. 395, 402, 333 N.E.2d 189, 194 (1975); People v. Williams, 73
A.D.2d 525, 525-26, 422 N.Y.S.2d 405, 406 (1979); Mitchell v. State, 408 P.2d 566, 572 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1965). See generally J. STEIN, supra note 2, §§ 90-93.
177 Kovash v. State, 519 P.2d 517, 521 (Okla. Crim. App. 1974) (appeal "to answer the
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highly inflammatory deterrence appeals, or striking the remarks,
have been held adequate judicial responses.""8 Other state courts
require a stronger response by the judge, including rebuke and rep-
rimand of the prosecutor and admonition of the jury in forceful
terms concerning the impropriety of the appeal. 1 9 By defining the
qualifying characteristics of improper debate and outlining specific
curative standards, these states ensure respect for the rules of ar-
gument and avoid needless appellate review.
The trial judge also can help curb abuses that result from the
various state preservation doctrines. Failure by defense counsel to
object at the time of improper argument frequently is held to con-
stitute a waiver, preventing the defendant from seeking appellate
review based on admission of the prosecutor's remarks.180 The re-
quired degree of persistence to preserve rhetorical error, and the
"hypertechnicality" of procedual steps that must be observed, 81
public's cry" for conviction was sufficiently cured by judge's remark that jurors should con-
sider evidence "and not respond to anything else that the public may be asking for"), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 830 (1974); see Crump, supra note 1, at 537 n. 221 (Texas cases).
178 E.g., Wideman v. State, 339 So. 2d 1378, 1382 (Miss. 1976) (sustaining objection
renders harmless the argument that defendant will rape again); Holifield v. State, 275 So. 2d
851, 856 (Miss. 1973) (sustaining objection sufficient to cure error in arguing that "next time
it might be your house that is burglarized"), cert. dismissed, 414 U.S. 990 (1973); State v.
Wilborn, 525 S.W.2d 87, 96 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975) (striking crime-in-the-streets rhetoric suffi-
cient to cure prejudice).
17, See Ailer v. State, 114 So. 2d 348, 351-52 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959) (trial judge must
"so affirmatively rebuke" the prosecutor as to impress jurors with the "gross impropriety" of
the appeal); State v. Hammonds, 290 N.C. 1, 11-13, 224 S.E.2d 595, 603-04 (1976). See gen-
erally J. STIN, supra note 2, §§ 90-91.
180 E.g., State v. Gonzales, 105 Ariz. 434, 437, 466 P.2d 388, 391 (1970) (if defendant
acquitted and "somebody comes along and kills you," prosecutor will tell jurors' survivors
that" 'we have got kind hearts. We don't prosecute anybody.' "); State v. Hayes, 364 So. 2d
923, 925-26 (La. 1978) (failure to object precluded reversal for prejudicial argument that
"[y]ou've got a pusher, a big pusher, and you have an opportunity to do something about it
and I pray that you do"); State v. Huson, 73 Wash. 2d 660, 662-64, 440 P.2d 192, 195 (1968)
(failure to object constituted waiver with regard to statement that, if defendant acquitted,
jurors "are going to be responsible for many, many killings of innocent people"), cert. de-
nied, 393 U.S. 1096 (1969).
181 See, e.g., Crump, supra note 1. Crump outlines the procedural maze for preservation
in Texas:
1. First, you must make an objection.... The objection must be made at the first
opportunity... 2. Your objection must be done with specificity... You cannot just
say: "I object, Your Honor.". . . 5. You must get a ruling from the trial court. Over-
ruled or sustained. 6. If your objection is sustained, you must then get a ruling from the
trial court to instruct the jury to disregard. 7. You must then make motion to strike
from the Record. 8. You must then move for a mistrial. 9. You must then object and
except for failure to grant your motion for mistrial. 10. If your objection is overruled,
you must then XXXXXXXobject and except to the Judge's ruling. 11. You must be
prepared to later renew your objection, whether it is sustained or not, when the State
makes the second pass.
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vary substantially from state to state. These preservation doctrines
often require Herculean diligence on the part of defense counsel,
and force him to appear to be obstructionist, annoying both judge
and jury, in order to enforce a client's rights. 82 They also presup-
pose a standard of rhetoric to which defense counsel can point in
objection. By hampering effective defense responses, the lack of
clear standards perpetuates rhetorical abuse. Several states, in re-
laxing the requirements for raising and preserving objections to
prosecutorial abuse, have expanded the judge's duty to act sua
sponte to "check and control" forbidden deterrence appeals. 183
C. Right-of-Reply Doctrine
Where the defendant admits committing the acts that consti-
tute the crime but defends himself by asking for sympathy and
leniency because of the trivial nature of the crime or the political
unpopularity of the law, it would be unwarranted to forbid the
prosecutor from responding by discussing the purposes of the law,
the seriousness of the crime, and the need for evenhanded verdicts.
Relevant responses can be accommodated under the traditional
"right-of-reply" doctrine.'" Where the defendant bases his defense
upon policy grounds, many opinions have recognized that although
Id. at 537 n.221 (quoting speech by Marvin Teague, Houston Bar Ass'n, Mar. 15, 1974).
182 E.g., Jones v. State, 437 S.W.2d 822, 824 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969) ("it's getting pretty
close to home, as you can see him [defense counsel] jumping up every couple of minutes
here"; trial judge instructed jury to disregard the remarks).
These preservation requirements place defense counsel in a cruel dilemma, forcing him
either to forgo objection or underscore the prosecutor's appeal. Judge Frank maintained
that "a prosecutor ought not deliberately and repeatedly ... put defendant's lawyer in such
an awkward dilemma." United States v. Grayson, 166 F.2d 863, 871 (2d Cir. 1948) (Frank,
J., concurring). See generally Singer, supra note 1, at 242-46.
13 See People v. Farrar, 36 Mich. App. 294, 299 n.6, 193 N.W.2d 363, 366 n.6 (1971);
People v. Plautz, 28 Mich. App. 621, 623, 184 N.W.2d 761, 762 (1970). While objection
should not be required for preservation of error, failure to object should be one strong factor
in considering whether the error was harmless. E.g., People v. Love, 91 Mich. App. 495, 504,
283 N.W.2d 781, 785 (1979); City of St. Paul v. Jackson, 293 Minn. 505, 506-07, 198 N.W.2d
275, 277 (1972). Note also the Supreme Court's clear statement in its supervisory role in a
civil case, New York Cent. R.R. v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 310, 318-19 (1929):
The public interest requires that the court of its own motion. . . protect suitors in
their right to a verdict uninfluenced by the appeals of counsel to passion or
prejudice .... Where such paramount considerations are involved, the failure of coun-
sel to particularize an exception will not preclude this Court from correcting the error.
1'4 See generally J. STEIN, supra note 2, § 88; see also ABA STANDARDs, supra note 7,
commentary to § 5.8(d) ("a prosecutor may be justified in making a reply to an argument of
defense counsel which may not have been proper if made without provocation").
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the prosecutor's subsequent rhetoric would otherwise be impermis-
sible, it was invited by improper defense assertions. 185 However,
many courts have used the right-of-reply doctrine as a rule of un-
clean hands that estops the defendant to object to prosecutorial
improprieties altogether, rather than as a limited corrective. 18
This results in a virtually unrestrained prosecutorial license, sanc-
tioning rhetorical appeals that go far beyond a mere response to
the language employed by defense counsel.18 7
CONCLUSION
The present level of judicial tolerance for deterrence appeals
by prosecutors varies significantly from state to state, ranging from
categorical strictures to doctrines routinely sanctioning shocking
appeals to fear and loathing. This comment has argued that the
former course is the correct one: deterrence appeals should be
prohibited.
81 E.g., State v. Sercovich, 246 La. 503, 522, 165 So. 2d 301, 307 (1964) (defendant
admitted sale of marijuana and made sympathy his main plea; prosecutor permitted to ar-
gue the social consequences of illicit narcotics); People v. Williams, 58 A.D.2d 943, 944-45,
397 N.Y.S.2d 444, 445-46 (1977) (prosecutor's remarks that "the South Bronx is a jungle, an
absolute jungle," and that "if you are going to find him not guilty, you're going to call those
cops liars and it was a frame" were fair reply to defense attorney's theory that his client was
"framed" without any evidence in support of that theory); State v. Watson, 20 Ohio App. 2d
115, 124-25, 252 N.E.2d 305, 313 (1969) (prosecutor's inflammatory remarks about black
militant excused because defendant had argued that state was attempting to conduct politi-
cal trial based on innuendo); Carnathon v. State, 478 S.W.2d 490,493-494 (Tex. Crim. App.)
(discussion of legislative purpose for probation laws prompted by defense counsel), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 866 (1972).
1" See J. STEiN, supra note 2, § 88; Alschuler, supra note 1, at 658; Crump, supra note
1, at 531-33.
187 See, e.g., State v. Karstetter, 110 Ariz. 539, 543-44, 521 P.2d 626, 630-31 (1974) (de-
fense discussion of reasonable doubt standard for insanity justified prosecutor's remarks
that the defendant would go free if found not guilty by reason of insanity); Minafee v. State,
482 S.W.2d 273, 275-76 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972) (defense argument that victim's testimony
was contradictory justified reply that acquittal will mean "that it's all right to go out and
find you an old man and one that can't remember and one that will get confused, and rob
him").
Professor Alachuler suggests that the doctrine be reformulated so that the question is
not "whether the prosecutor was 'provoked,' but whether the prosecutor's action was reason-
ably designed to remedy the wrong perpetrated by the defense." Alachuler, supra note 1, at
658.
In any event, the import of the right-of-reply doctrine is easily exaggerated; defense
counsel are forbidden to argue social policy, and trial judges routinely prevent such appeals
sua sponte. See ABA STANDRs, supra note 7, commentary to § 5.8(d) ("The better solu-
tion [than right of reply] lies in having advocates adequately instructed as to the limits of
proper argument and trial judges willing to enforce fair rules as to such limits.").
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To give effect to this conclusion in the courtroom, the "fear-
less administration" doctrine must be discarded, and the improper
application of the harmless error rule must be curtailed. The states
should announce clear standards to govern prosecutorial rhetoric,
and these standards should be vigorously enforced by trial judges
so as to conserve resources at the appellate level. Until such stan-
dards are employed, the prevalence of prejudicial deterrence rheto-
ric will remain a compelling example of how our standards of crim-
inal procedure are "the measures by which the quality of our
civilization may be judged."188
Charles G. Curtis Jr.
18 Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 449 (1962) (footnote omitted).
